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I. THE TROUBLE BEGINS
A traveler passing through the Fort Trumbull area of New London,
Connecticut, in recent years would likely not find it all that notewor-
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thy. The area is not home to shiny skyscrapers or fancy hotels.1
There are few modern architectural designs at which to marvel. In-
stead, the area is dotted with seemingly "ordinary" single-family
homes, apartments, and other structures. 2 While the area may not be
as aesthetically pleasing as wealthier or more modern neighborhoods,
it is still home to many residents. Some local residents have lived in
the same houses for decades. Others have only recently moved to the
area but nonetheless have quickly come to appreciate the scenery and
proximity to the water.3 Still others have owned investment proper-
ties in the area for several years and have continuously spent time
and money on improvements.4
As citizens of the State of Connecticut and the United States, these
property owners are afforded the constitutional assurance that the
government will be precluded from taking their property absent two
requirements: the taking is for a "public use" and the owners receive
"just compensation" for their property. 5 These constitutional limits
imposed upon the government are clearly necessary. Without such re-
straints, the government could whimsically divest individuals of ar-
guably their most valuable asset. Balanced with this right to freely
possess property is the governmental need to acquire land for the pur-
pose of building highways, railroads, and other large-scale public
projects.6 Regardless of the disputes that may erupt concerning the
adequacy of monetary compensation for the view enjoyed from one's
front porch or from the comfort of a life-long home, the Founders of
this country thought it necessary to afford the sovereign with such
power as long as the property was being taken for a public use.7
Because the power of the government to exercise eminent domain
is confined to public uses, legislators, courts, and scholars have long
debated the appropriate interpretation and meaning of the phrase
"public use." Over the course of the twentieth century, interpretation
of public use has grown exceedingly broad.8 The most recent attempt
to broaden the meaning of public use has arisen in the context of gov-
ernmental takings purely for the purpose of economic redevelopment.
Illustratively, in January 2000, the City of New London, Connecticut,
1. See infra section II.B.
2. See infra section I.B.
3. Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Mar. 13, 2002), rev'd in part, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2655
(2005).
4. Id.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. See infra section II.A.
7. The issue of what amount of money is "just compensation" has generated a large
body of case law and commentary. Such discussion is outside the scope of this
Note.
8. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
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acting pursuant to Connecticut law, authorized a development corpo-
ration to exercise the power of eminent domain in conjunction with its
plan to economically rejuvenate the distressed Fort Trumbull area. 9
The power was to be exercised only if negotiations with property own-
ers proved unsuccessful. 10 Upon the refusal of Susette Kelo and a
handful of her neighbors [hereinafter property owners] to accept the
development corporation's monetary offers, eviction notices were
tacked to their doors the day after Thanksgiving in November 2000.11
The property owners sought to enjoin the development corporation
from exercising the city's eminent domain powers, 12 claiming that the
use of eminent domain would ultimately benefit private entities.
Eventually, the United States Supreme Court found the dispute at its
doorstep, granting certiorari to the decision of the Connecticut Su-
preme Court which ruled wholly in favor of the city.13 On review, the
Court upheld the decision, affording great deference to the determina-
tion of the Connecticut General Assembly.14
This Note illustrates that by affording such a high level of defer-
ence to state legislature's determination that economic development is
a legitimate public use pursuant to the Takings Clause of the United
States Constitution, the Court markedly extended its prior eminent
domain precedent and lessened the constitutional rights of individual
landowners. These rights have been slowly eroded over the past fifty
years, and the Court's decision in Kelo serves as a signal that this
erosion will continue indefinitely. As is demonstrated throughout this
Note, it is now up to the individual states-either through state con-
stitutional interpretation or legislative action-to counterbalance the
Kelo decision and refortify the fundamental right to possess individual
property.
Part II of this Note provides a general overview of the progression
of eminent domain jurisprudence as well as New London's develop-
ment plan. Part III presents a detailed factual background of the case
of Kelo v. City of New London. Particular attention is paid to the stat-
utory and constitutional analysis applied by the Connecticut Supreme
Court as well as the United States Supreme Court. Part IV provides a
critical analysis of the Court's majority opinion, revealing a subtle, yet
significant departure from its prior precedent when faced with the re-
9. See infra section II.B.
10. See infra section I.B.
11. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 510 (2004), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2655
(2005).
12. Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Mar. 13, 2002), rev'd in part, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2655
(2005).
13. Kelo v. City of New London, 542 U.S. 965, granting cert. to 843 A.2d 500 (Conn.
2004).
14. See infra section III.B.
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sponsibility to review the constitutionality of the proposed use of emi-
nent domain. Finally, this Note presents suggestions for
reestablishing the rights of individual property owners. A suggestion
for heightened judicial review of economic development takings de-
vised by the Michigan Supreme Court in County of Wayne v. Hath-
cock 15 is examined as well as state legislative action with a special
emphasis on the State of Nebraska and the recent response of the Ne-
braska Unicameral.
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
While most legal scholars and commentators would likely agree
eminent domain is necessary at least to some degree, the debate over
the breadth of this power is alive and well. In response to a handful of
landmark decisions from the United States Supreme Court, states like
Connecticut have enacted statutes giving the government wide discre-
tion in exercising this power.
A. History of Eminent Domain
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
in pertinent part that "private property [shall not] be taken for public
use, without just compensation."16 Traditionally, the government has
exercised this power to further the implementation of projects clearly
for use of the public, such as the construction of roads, railways, dams,
and other projects providing for public utility.17 The government's re-
tention of this ability is of paramount importance. Without reserving
such power in the sovereign, it would be virtually impossible to assem-
ble miles upon miles of contiguous land for the creation of necessary
improvements such as the interstate highway system. Regardless of
how inclusive or exclusive the drafters of the Constitution intended
this power to be, over the last half of the twentieth century, courts
became increasingly receptive to a broader interpretation.18 As one
commentator noted,
15. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. See, e.g., Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992)
(affirming condemnation of almost fifty miles of railroad track along with a sub-
sequent conveyance to Amtrak); Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269
U.S. 55 (1925) (affirming condemnation of land for use by the United States mili-
tary); Rindge Co. v. County of L.A., 262 U.S. 700 (1923) (affirming condemnation
of privately held land for the construction of public highways).
18. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (finding a valid public
use in the transfer of privately held land to other private individuals for the pur-
pose of breaking up a land oligopoly); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28-29
(1954) (holding a taking of property with the intention of transferring it to a pri-
vate entity in order to effectuate a blight-clearance plan as a public use);
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981) (hold-
[Vol. 85:547
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During the twentieth century... governments began to employ eminent do-
main for purposes whose public utility was strained, if not tenuous. This
trend has continued until the present, and it is now a rather routine occur-
rence for the homes and businesses of private citizens to be claimed by the
government and transferred to private entities in pursuit of a more efficient
use of the land. 1 9
Two landmark decisions from the United States Supreme Court,
Berman v. Parker2 0 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,21 have
fueled this expansive understanding and are often used to demon-
strate the Court's willingness to afford the phrase a broad interpreta-
tion. 22 In Berman, the Court was asked to determine whether taking
land within an area deemed "blighted" for the purpose of community
redevelopment was consistent with the Takings Clause.23 Specifi-
cally, the dispute was brought by a business owner who happened to
own property within a blighted area tagged for redevelopment al-
though his particular property was not in fact blighted.24 The owner
did not object to the rejuvenation of his neighborhood, but contended
that since his property was not classified as blighted, he should be
able to remain in his present location.25 The Court disagreed, and
found that the comprehensive plan developed by Congress was enti-
tled deference. Thus, the Court reasoned, if Congress deemed the re-
moval of all existing structures an integral component of its plan, it
was not the Court's place to disagree. 26 The Court ultimately found
that "attack[ing] the problem of the blighted parts of the community"
was clearly a public use according to the Takings Clause regardless of
the condition of any individual structure. 2 7
In Midkiff, the issue presented to the Court was whether the tak-
ing of individuals' property for redistribution to other citizens in the
furtherance of a plan to break up a land oligopoly was a public use
ing the public-use clause satisfied with the anticipation of increased tax revenue
and new jobs by the creation of a new automobile assembly plant), overruled by
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (2004). For a complete analysis of
the exercise of eminent domain and the factors implicated in any decision, see
29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 62 (2006).
19. Steven E. Buckingham, Comment, The Kelo Threshold: Private Property and
Public Use Reconsidered, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1279, 1281 (2005) (citations
omitted).
20. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
21. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
22. See infra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
23. Berman, 348 U.S. at 28-29.
24. Id. at 34-36.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 34. See also Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 61, 65 (1986) (postulating that if courts insist on affording extreme defer-
ence to the ends accomplished by the takings, the courts should at least attempt
to evaluate the proposed means by which to achieve those ends).
2006]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
within the meaning of the Constitution. 28 The Court noted the ex-
treme disparity in land ownership on the various Hawaiian islands
along with the well-documented escalating prices of real property.2
9
It then determined that since Hawaii's legislature could have ration-
ally determined that the disputed redistribution scheme would put an
end to this situation, it was a valid public use under the takings
clauses of the state and federal constitutions. 30 The Court, relying on
language from its decision in Berman, found that deference to the
state legislature's plan to rid the state of the "social and economic evils
of a land oligopoly" was appropriate and consistent with precedent.31
Undeniably, a great number of lower courts have afforded a broad
and inclusive interpretation to the phrase "public use" relying on one
or both of these landmark decisions. Illustratively, in Poletown Neigh-
borhood Council v. City of Detroit,3 2 the Michigan Supreme Court up-
held the validity of taking private property for the creation of an
automobile assembly plant. The local development corporation that
sought to exercise the sovereign's power of eminent domain predicted
a significant increase in tax revenue and jobs for the local community,
thus providing relief from economic distress. 3 3 In upholding the appli-
cation of the state statute,34 the court relied upon the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Berman and held that "when a legislature
speaks, the public interest has been declared in terms 'well-nigh con-
clusive."'35 In response to such favorable judicial appraisal of statutes
permitting takings for the purpose of economic development, the Con-
necticut General Assembly enacted legislation providing that similar
28. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). The Hawaii Legislature deter-
mined that while forty-nine percent of the state's land was held by the federal
and state governments, a group of seventy-two private landowners held forty-
seven percent of the remaining land. Id. at 232. Based upon these disparate
percentages, the legislature further determined that such a land distribution was
wholly responsible for the state's inflated real estate market. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 241-45.
31. Id. at 241-42. Arguably, the Court's holding in Midkiffgreatly expanded upon its
holding in Berman by declaring that eminent domain authority is "coterminous
with the scope of a sovereign's police powers." Id. at 240. Some commentators
have noted that this language from Midkiff provides a virtually unrestrained
ability among the states to exercise eminent domain authority. See, e.g., Rachel
A. Lewis, Strike That, Reverse It: County of Wayne v. Hathcock" Michigan Rede-
fines Implementing Economic Development Through Eminent Domain, 50 VILL. L.
REv. 341, 355-56 (2005) (citations omitted).
32. 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d
765 (2004).
33. Id. at 465 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
34. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 125.1622 (West 2006) (authorizing municipalities
to acquire property by condemnation and to transfer such property to private
users in furtherance of essential public purposes such as industrial and commer-
cial development).
35. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)).
[Vol. 85:547
2006] TROUBLE IN FORT TRUMBULL
projects, when implemented in accordance with detailed criteria,
would be consistent with the limitations delineated by the state and
federal constitutions. 36 Upon this general background, the City of
New London attempted to implement such a project.
B. The Development Timeline
The economy of New London, Connecticut, has long been driven by
defense contracts with the federal government.3 7 At the conclusion of
the Cold War, the economy of southeastern Connecticut, and in partic-
ular New London, plummeted with the massive reduction in defense
spending and the decreased need for new vessels of war.38 Thousands
of jobs were lost, and the waterfront area, once the center of city eco-
nomic activity, became vacant. 39 In an effort to reinvigorate the local
economy and provide the financial support required for redevelopment
of the depressed waterfront-specifically the Fort Trumbull area-the
Connecticut State Bond Commission authorized the use of bonds in
early 1998.40 Shortly thereafter, Pfizer, Inc. announced its plans to
build a $270 million global research and development facility on a site
adjacent to the Fort Trumbull area, known as New London Mills.41
Envisioning a golden opportunity to redevelop the Fort Trumbull area
in concert with Pfizer's plans, New London city officials sought to des-
ignate a ninety-acre area around New London Mills for the construc-
tion of several commercial and residential improvements. 42
36. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-186 to -200b (West 2006). The declaration of policy
provides that
the economic welfare of the state depends upon the continued growth of
industry and business ... [and] that permitting and assisting municipal-
ities to acquire and improve unified land . . . and, in distressed munici-
palities, to lend funds to businesses and industries . . . are public uses
and purposes for which public moneys may be expended; and that the
necessity in the public interest for the provisions of this chapter is
hereby declared as a matter of legislative determination.
Id. § 8-186.
37. Robert A. Hamilton, Counting on Pfizer?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2001, at CT1.
38. Id.
39. Elizabeth F. Gallagher, Note, Breaking New Ground: Using Eminent Domain for
Economic Development, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837, 1837 (2005).
40. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 508 (Conn. 2004), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2655
(2005).
41. Id.; see also Gallagher, supra note 39, at 1837-38.
42. Laura Mansnerus, Ties to a Neighborhood at Root of Court Fight, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 2001, at B5. Mr. Mahoney, former director of the New London Develop-
ment Corporation, conceded that Pfizer representatives were involved in the ini-
tial planning stages of the development plan and that plans for a four-star hotel
and an upscale housing development were largely driven by the belief that the
presence of Pfizer would necessitate such projects. Kelo v. City of New London,
No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238, at *38 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002), rev'd in
part, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). In fact, Pfizer
explicitly requested a four-star hotel and conference center. Id.
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In accordance with chapters 130, 132, and 588 of the Connecticut
Statutes, the City of New London gave approval to a nonprofit devel-
opment corporation to begin the development of a comprehensive
plan. 43 The highly detailed plan predicted several advantageous con-
sequences for the community. In the words of the Connecticut Su-
preme Court, the plan was "projected to create in excess of 1000 jobs,
to increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an economically
distressed city, including its downtown and waterfront areas."44 More
specifically, the court noted that the "plan is expected to generate ap-
proximately between: (1) 518 and 867 construction jobs; (2) 718 and
1362 direct jobs; and (3) 500 and 940 indirect jobs."45 In addition to
the increase in jobs, it was estimated that the plan could provide as
much as $1,249,843 in tax revenue for the city.46 The plan itself was
further organized into seven distinct parcels, with each parcel's antici-
pated attributes detailed to a greater or lesser degree of specificity.
4 7
Despite careful planning, the development corporation still faced
the formidable task of juxtaposing the plan over the heart of a non-
symmetrical colonial city.48 Particularly on the East Coast, the cen-
ters of many aged urban areas are arranged in seemingly random and
complex fashion as a result of several redevelopment and restoration
projects dating back to colonial times. Indeed, in New London, the
proposed site was comprised of 115 individual land parcels made up of
residential and commercial interests owned by numerous individu-
als.4 9 Recognizing the inherent difficulty in assembling large contigu-
ous tracts of land for the purpose of community redevelopment, the
state legislature had enacted legislation affording the ability of a de-
velopment corporation to condemn nonblighted land that is "essential
to complete an adequate unit of development."50
Acting upon the authority granted to it by the legislature, in Janu-
ary 2000, the city approved the development corporation's plan and
granted the corporation the ability to acquire the necessary prop-
43. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 508; see also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
44. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 507.
45. Id. at 510.
46. Id. Absent the new development, the entire ninety-acre area had an annual tax
revenue of $325,000. Kelo, 2002 WL 500238, at *40.
47. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 509-10. One of the main arguments presented by the property
owners was that parcel 4A of the plan, which encompassed several of their
homes, did not provide a definite explanation as to its future use. Id. at 569.
Indeed, the Court noted that the 2.4 acres that constituted parcel 4A would be
used "either to support the adjacent state park, by providing parking or retail
services for visitors, or to support the nearby marina." Kelo v. City of New
London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2659 (2005).
48. An appendix to the court's opinion provides a map for the area affected by the
Fort Trumbull Municipal Development Plan. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 603.
49. Id. at 509.
50. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-125 (West 2006). See also id. § 8-128.
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erty.51 After negotiations with several private landowners stalled, the
corporation voted to use the power of eminent domain to condemn the
properties despite resistance. 5 2 In November 2000, the corporation
filed condemnation proceedings to remove the remaining landowners,
and one month later the property owners brought suit against the city
challenging its exercise of eminent domain via the development corpo-
ration. 53 The property owners represent a diverse group of citizens,
some having lived in the same homes since birth, some having re-
cently purchased homes, and others holding property for investment
purposes. 54 The property owners alleged the city violated equal pro-
tection and due process, and the Superior Court for the Judicial Dis-
trict of New London responded by granting in part their request for a
permanent injunction of the proposed plan.55 All involved parties ap-
pealed that decision to the state's supreme court.
III. THE CASE OF KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON
As the case worked its way through the Connecticut Supreme
Court and eventually to the United States Supreme Court, many in
the legal profession excitedly anticipated a detailed pronouncement
from the Court answering the questions left open by its previous deci-
sions concerning eminent domain. Indeed, some scholars tried to pre-
dict the course the Court would take. 56
A. The Connecticut Supreme Court Decision
One of the pivotal issues on appeal to the state supreme court was
whether a taking for economic development satisfied the public-use
clauses of the state and federal constitutions. 5 7 Specifically, the prop-
erty owners argued that economic development could not constitute a
51. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 510.
52. Id. at 510-11.
53. Id. at 511.
54. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2660 (2005). The property owners
were generally not opposed to the redevelopment of the Fort Trumbull area; they
merely favored one of the alternative plans under which they could remain in
their homes. Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238, at *3
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002), rev'd in part, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), affid,
125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
55. Kelo, 2002 WL 500238, at *112. The Superior Court denied the taking of prop-
erty owners' land in a few specific parcels under which the ultimate use was
overly vague and provided a temporary injunction pending resolution of the is-
sues at the appellate level. Id. at *76-77, 112.
56. See, e.g., Buckingham, supra note 19, at 1283 ("[T]he ultimate conclusion of this
article is that Kelo will deliver a limitation upon the ability of governments to
exercise eminent domain and rein in what has become a nearly unfettered power
to condemn private property.").
57. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 519-20.
2006]
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public use as a general matter.5 8 In the alternative, they claimed that
even if such takings are constitutional, the takings in the instant case
were not, especially in the context of parcels 3 and 4A.59 Conversely,
the city contended that the lower court afforded appropriate deference
to legislative determinations that takings for economic development
are a valid public use and that the takings in New London were valid
examples of such.
6 °
As a matter of first impression, the court agreed with the city and
held that "economic development projects created and implemented
pursuant to chapter 132 ... satisfy the public use clauses of the state
and federal constitutions."6 1 The court based its decision upon prior
state and federal precedent providing that legislative determinations
are to be afforded extreme deference by reviewing courts, and that if
the state legislature made the determination that certain takings
were for a public use, the court had limited authority to intervene to
the contrary. 62 Indeed, the court found substantial assistance from
the United States Supreme Court, which had previously held that "if a
legislature, state or federal, determines there are substantial reasons
for an exercise of the taking power, courts must defer to its determina-
tion that the taking will serve a public use."63 In its overly thorough
opinion, the state supreme court clearly asserted its intention to
broadly interpret the state and federal constitutional limitations re-
garding takings.6 4 The court was not unanimous in this determina-
tion; three members advocated for heightened judicial review in their
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part to that of the
majority.6 5
B. The United States Supreme Court Affirms the
Connecticut Decision
In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court determined
that in light of past precedent on both state and national levels, a
broad and inclusive interpretation of what constitutes public use was
appropriate.6 6 Thus, it found no error in the analysis employed by the
Connecticut Supreme Court. The Court relied heavily on its previous
decisions in Berman v. Parker and Hawaii Housing Authority v.
58. Id.
59. Id.; see also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
60. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 520.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 522-31.
63. Id. at 527 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984)).
64. Id. at 520-21.
65. Id. at 587-600 (Zarella, J., dissenting). Specifically, the dissenting justices ar-
gued for the adoption of a four-step process which shifts the burden of proof be-
tween the involved parties at various stages. Id. at 587.
66. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2661-65 (2005).
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Midkiff, noting that the broad interpretation of public use reflects the
Court's "longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in
this field."67 In Berman and Midkiff, the Court justified the use of
eminent domain for the purposes of blight removal and the destruc-
tion of a land oligopoly, respectively.68 Similarly, in Kelo the Court
reasoned that the city's desire to economically rejuvenate a distressed
area was likewise entitled deference, noting not only its tradition for
affording deference, but also its belief that the city's development plan
was thoroughly deliberated and was comprehensive in its character. 69
The majority also determined that a heightened form of judicial
review would be wholly inappropriate and especially disadvantageous
in certain situations.70 Specifically, the Court reasoned that "[a] con-
stitutional rule that required postponement of the judicial approval of
every condemnation until the likelihood of success of the plan had
been assured would unquestionably impose a significant impediment
to the successful consummation of many such plans."7 1 Moreover,
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, asserted that "[a] broad
per se rule or a strong presumption of invalidity.., would prohibit a
large number of government takings."72 In sum, the majority found
the application of the "rational basis" test to be an appropriate and
sufficient safeguard against the taking of property specifically to favor
a private party and offering public benefits as a mere pretext. 73
The Court concluded its discussion by addressing the fact that the
condemnations may impose extreme hardships on the individuals in-
volved.7 4 In light of this reality, the Court emphasized that individual
states are free to impose more stringent regulations on the taking of
private land via state judicial refinements, amendments to state con-
stitutions, or through statutory action.75 Since the Court determined
that precedent dictated a broad interpretation of the phrase "public
67. Id. at 2663.
68. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 229; Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see also supra
notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
69. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2664-65.
70. Id. at 2667-68.
71. Id. at 2668.
72. Id. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 2667. In the context of takings, the rational basis test provides that a court
can only disturb a legislature's determination that a taking is necessary if there
is no rational basis for a belief that such a taking will bestow a benefit upon the
public. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1015-16 & n.18 (1984). In
applying this standard of review, the Court found no such abuses on the part of
the Connecticut Legislature in this case. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667-68.
74. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
75. Id. Indeed, the Michigan Supreme Court has recently limited the ability to take
for economic development by overruling its infamous decision in Poletown. See




use," the takings at issue before them complied, and thus any applica-
tion of heightened levels of judicial review would be inappropriate.
76
IV. THE COURT'S DECISION IN KELO SIGNALS A FURTHER
DESCENT DOWN A SLIPPERY SLOPE
In its majority opinion, the Court reasoned that its conclusion is
wholly consistent with the previous decisions of Berman v. Parker and
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.77 However, a close examination
of the opinion in Kelo v. City of New London reveals a subtle departure
from the established precedent created by these two decisions, and
correspondingly a further erosion of the protection afforded personal
property rights under the United States Constitution.
A. Further down the Slope
The progression of the Court's eminent domain jurisprudence, from
Berman v. Parker to Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, and now to
Kelo v. City of New London, presents a good illustration of what is
known as a "slippery slope." The idea that a particular decision, while
desirable in and of itself, is objectionable due to the possibility of lay-
ing the groundwork for an undesirable extension at some point in the
future has long been a concern of judicial scholars.7 8 This concern,
however, is counterbalanced by the realization that one should not
evade making a fundamentally sound decision today based solely on
speculation of future misapplication. 79 This tension is often intensi-
fied in the judiciary because judges are bound to apply prior precedent
when reaching a decision in any given case. As Professor Eugene
Volokh explains in his article The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope,
"[JIudges may well conclude that they should assume that the prece-
dents are morally or empirically sound, at least unless there's some
strong reason to doubt their soundness."8 0 Such conclusions may lead
to a reluctance to overrule broadly drafted precedent and instead "fit"
future decisions within the prior reasoning.8 1 The result is a gradual
expansion and broadening of the justifications initially underlying the
first decision, thereby creating a slippery slope.8 2 This phenomenon is
apparent when one traces the Court's eminent domain jurisprudence
from Berman to Midkiff and now to Kelo.
76. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667-68.
77. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
78. See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARv. L. REV.
1026, 1029 (2003).
79. Id. at 1029-30.
80. Id. at 1098.
81. Id. at 1097-99.
82. Id.
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In Berman, the Court arguably took the first step down the slope
by holding that the Takings Clause did not preclude the government
from taking privately held land only to turn it over to a different pri-
vate entity for the purpose of redevelopment.8 3 By refusing to hold
that "public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public pur-
poses of community redevelopment projects,"8 4 the Court set the stage
for a slow erosion of personal property rights.8 5 In Midkiff, the Court
continued down the slope, arguably creating a rather significant ex-
tension by holding that "[t]he 'public use' requirement is ... cotermi-
nous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers."8 6 As previously
noted, the Court determined that governmental redistribution of pri-
vately held land constituted a public use when the legislature sought
to rid the state of a well-entrenched land oligopoly.8 7
In Berman and Midkiff, the Court delineated a policy of legislative
deference as a justification for the government takings at issue.8 8
While the decisions reached in Berman and Midkiff may be desirable
in and of themselves, the opinions left the door open for broader future
interpretations. Indeed, as Professor Volokh has described, "One of
the most common 'A will lead to B' arguments is the argument that
judicial decision A would 'set a precedent' for decision B. This gener-
ally means that (1) A would rest on some justification J and (2) justifi-
cation J would also justify B."89 Moreover, "[a] related legal effect
slippery slope may happen when the justification underlying A is
vague enough that it could justify B, even if this effect isn't certain."90
Applying this reasoning to the Court's eminent domain jurispru-
dence, the presence of a slippery slope becomes evident. The Court's
justification for allowing the exercise of eminent domain in Berman
and Midkiff was removing the social harms of blight and a land oligop-
oly, respectively. However, the language used to justify these takings
was broad enough to open the door to a myriad of interpretations. In
Kelo, the Court walked through this open door and used the language
to justify governmental takings for purely economic reasons. Indeed,
the cases are distinguishable as the type of harm sought to be allevi-
ated by the disputed takings in Berman and Midkiff was qualitatively
different than the harm present in Kelo. In Kelo, there was no harm
being inflicted upon society by the current use to which the property
83. 348 U.S. 26, 33-35; see also supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
84. Berman, 348 U.S. at 34.
85. See Buckingham, supra note 19.
86. 467 U.S. 229, 240. See also supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
88. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32-33; Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 239-40.
89. Volokh, supra note 78, at 1064 (footnotes omitted).
90. Id. at 1065.
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owners put their homes.91 While the area was classified as "economi-
cally distressed," this by no means was a result of any activity of the
property owners. 9 2 In Berman and Midkiff, the "precondemnation use
of the targeted property inflicted affirmative harm on society... [a]nd
in both cases, the relevant legislative body had found that eliminating
the existing property use was necessary to remedy the harm."9 3 De-
spite this qualitative difference, the justifications underlying the prior
precedent were sufficiently vague so as to lay the framework for an
extension. As Justice O'Connor succinctly explained in her dissent,
this extension provides that "the sovereign may take private property
currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new, ordi-
nary private use, so long as the new use is predicted to generate some
secondary benefit for the public-such as increased tax revenue, more
jobs, maybe even aesthetic pleasure."9 4
There appears to be no end it sight to the Court's slide down the
slippery slope of eminent domain jurisprudence. With its decision in
Kelo, the Court has determined that the public benefit of increased tax
revenue falls within the public use requirement of the Fifth Amend-
ment. 95 Justice O'Connor is rightly concerned that if the benefit the
public could derive from tax revenue is a public use, the Court is lim-
91. The trial court determined that the property owners' homes, in contrast to the
general Fort Trumbull area, "all seem to be in fine condition and many of [the
property owners] have spent considerable time and resources in maintaining
their property." Kelo v. City of New London, 2002 WL 500238, at *40 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002), rev'd in part, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), affd, 125 S.
Ct. 2655 (2005). To the contrary, in Midkiff, the very ownership of the private
property at issue is what furthered the land oligopoly. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233.
92. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text; cf. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 229;
Berman, 348 U.S. 26.
93. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2674-75 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). Justice O'Connor's interpretation of the Court's reasoning in Midkiff is
noteworthy given that she wrote the majority opinion in Midkiff, but still found
herself on the losing side of Kelo in a 5-4 split. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 231.
94. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). At the risk of beleaguering the
point, the Court has progressed from determining that private enterprises remov-
ing blight from a downtown area pursuant to a redevelopment plan is a public
use (Berman) to determining that redistributing land among private parties to
end a land oligopoly is a public use (Midkift) to most recently determining that a
potential for increased tax revenues spurred by private development is a public
use (Kelo). There appears to be no end in sight to this erosion.
95. There are many implications to this determination both unaddressed by the
Court and outside the scope of this Note. Examples include the following: How
much of an increase in tax revenue is needed for the "public benefit" threshold to
be crossed? Should this benefit be counterbalanced by the cost of the displace-
ment of the previous residents? And finally, Is there any disparity between the
price the government entity paid for the land versus the price for which the land
was sold to the private enterprise that must be recouped before any benefit is
actually recognized? These are just a few of the potential issues necessarily
raised by the Court's decision.
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ited only by the imaginations of its members as to what else may be
determined a public use in the future.
One could argue that Kelo is consistent with past decisions because
the Court simply deferred to a local legislative judgment.96 Whether
it be the judgment of the legislature that eminent domain should be
invoked to remove blight, break up a land oligopoly, or cure economic
distress, the Court is in all cases merely upholding a reasonable deter-
mination by the legislature. Indeed, the oft-cited language from
Berman provides that when a legislature has spoken, as long as its
proclamation is rational, the federal judiciary is not the appropriate
place to debate such a determination. 9 7 However, even though it is
appropriate for the Court to afford deference to legislative determina-
tions, it is likewise appropriate that the Court retain its role in "re-
viewing a legislature's judgment of what constitutes a public use."98
Such review was appropriately applied in Berman and Midkiff where
the Court twice found that even though private parties would ulti-
mately benefit from the forced transfer of property, the public would
still receive the essential benefit since the takings effectuated the re-
moval of something detrimental. It is well established that the ques-
tion of whether a proposed taking is truly for a public use is one for the
judiciary to analyze, and this analytical power is indeed necessary to
maintain constraints on the government's use of eminent domain. 99
The Court noted that if it were to be confronted with a situation
where a private party was clearly the primary beneficiary of a govern-
ment-authorized taking, it would not pass constitutional muster.10 0
While this language is rampant throughout the Court's opinion, in ac-
tuality, it will likely prove exceedingly difficult to enforce.lo' In the
context of takings for the purpose of economic development it may
serve as no limitation whatsoever. As Justice O'Connor noted, "The
96. Indeed, "[iln the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the con-
trary, where the use for which property is sought to be taken under the power of
eminent domain is public, the necessity, expediency, or propriety of exercising the
power ordinarily is a legislative or political, and not a judicial, question." 29A
C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 62 (2006) (citing Rindge Co. v. L.A. County, 262 U.S.
700 (1923); Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668 (1923)).
97. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663-68; see also supra section III.B.
98. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240;
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
99. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Cincinnati v. Vester, 281
U.S. 439, 446 (1950).
100. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661-63. The Court again premises this statement on the
rational basis test, holding that as long as the legislative body providing the tak-
ing power could have rationally believed that such a plan was for a public pur-
pose, it is not the Court's duty to interfere.
101. See Volokh, supra note 78, at 1093 (contending that judges concerned with the
possibility of a decision being extended beyond its justifications could alleviate
this problem by making their justifications explicit in their opinions or by provid-
ing detailed examples of when an application would not be appropriate).
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trouble with economic development takings is that private benefit and
incidental public benefit are, by definition, merged and mutually rein-
forcing." 10 2 If the legislature is only required to believe that there
could be a rational purpose to effectuate a taking, it strains the imagi-
nation to come up with a situation (absent the blatant and absurd ex-
amples) which would not be "rational."103 It seems to follow logically
from the Court's opinion that "[n]othing is to prevent the State from
replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping
mall, or any farm with a factory" since each of these would rationally
create more tax revenue and jobs, and thereby potentially "benefit"
the public. 0 4
Despite writing for the losing side of the 5-4 opinion, Justices
O'Connor and Thomas have subsequently found some support for
their positions from an unusual source. In a remarkably candid mo-
ment, Justice John Paul Stevens, the author of the Court's opinion in
Kelo, has since announced his personal views regarding the case.' 0 5
Seemingly struggling with the views expressed in the dissenting opin-
ions of Justices O'Connor and Thomas, Justice Stevens was quoted as
saying that he personally thought the decision was imprudent, but
that he "was convinced that the law compelled a result that [he] would
have opposed if [he] were a legislator."1o6 While Justice Stevens
surely made the point that he remains faithful to his idea of interpre-
102. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
103. See Gallagher, supra note 39 (providing a comprehensive analysis of individual
states that have decided the constitutionality of using eminent domain to effectu-
ate economic development).
104. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas, in his dis-
sent, further emphasized the absurdity of "affording almost insurmountable def-
erence to legislative conclusions" by drawing a relation to the Court's review of
abuses concerning other sections of the Bill of Rights. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2684
(Thomas, J., dissenting). For instance, Justice Thomas opined that the Court
would not defer to a legislature's determination of the various circum-
stances that establish, for example, when a search of a home would be
reasonable, or when a convicted double-murderer may be shackled dur-
ing a sentencing proceeding without on-the-record findings, or when
state law creates a property interest protected by the Due Process
Clause.
Id. (citations omitted). Pointedly, affording such deference in the context of gov-
ernmental takings is inconsistent with established precedent, and indeed, the
quintessential purpose of the Court. See Volokh, supra note 78, at 1100 (noting
that judges "may want to be concerned when crafting their proposed tests" so that
a decision they intended to rest on a limited principle is not later interpreted as
supporting a much broader principle).
105. Linda Greenhouse, Justice Weighs Desire v. Duty (Duty Prevails), N.Y. TiMEs,
Aug. 25, 2005, at Al.
106. Id. Prior to these statements by Justice Stevens, the Court announced its deci-
sion to deny a rehearing of the Kelo controversy. See Eminent Domain Denied
Rehearing, LINCOLN J. STAR, Aug. 23, 2005, at 4A.
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tation, his statements likely offer no consolation to the property own-
ers evicted from their homes in New London.
B. Under Heightened Judicial Scrutiny, the New London
Takings May be Constitutional
Had the Court simply applied the holdings of Berman v. Parker
and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff to the factual context of Kelo
rather than further extending the level of legislative deference af-
forded, it is debatable whether the takings at issue were in accordance
with the Constitution. The Court generally has a responsibility to
serve as a final check on the propriety of state laws that may impinge
on the constitutional rights of citizens.O? The Connecticut Constitu-
tion, similar to that of the United States, provides that "[t]he property
of no person shall be taken for public use, without just compensation
therefor." 0 8 In order to streamline the process of redeveloping dis-
tressed areas throughout the state, the legislature enacted a series of
laws that brought economic development projects within the purview
of public use.1 0 9 Despite great debate over whether such takings are
truly for public use, the Court deferred to the legislature and effec-
tively rubber-stamped the statute as constitutional.11o
Many commentators, as well as the Court in Kelo, have recognized
that a bright-line proscription of takings for economic development
paints too broad a stroke."'1 However, the Court's decision to approve
the legislature's determination with almost no review tips the scales
too far in the other direction. Some sort of middle ground must be
reached in order to maintain the necessary limitations placed upon
the government's ability to exercise its power of eminent domain. Not-
ing the sensitive nature of economic development plans and the multi-
tude of variables in each specific plan, one commentator has suggested
a nonexhaustive list of factors that should be examined by a reviewing
court.112 The desired end product in Kelo-a revitalized economy for
107. See generally Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 481
n.10 (1987) (stating in dicta that the restriction on taking of public property for
public use without just compensation is made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment).
108. CONN. CONST. art. I, § 11.
109. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-186 to -200b (West 2006); see also supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
110. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005).
111. Id. (rejecting the "bright-line rule that economic development does not qualify as
a public use"); see also Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Public Use or Public Abuse, 68
UMKC L. REv. 49, 68-74 (1999) (offering several alternatives to a bright-line rule
deciding the public-use issue in a per se manner).
112. Lazzarotti, supra note 111, at 68. Lazzarotti's list includes such things as the
project's goals, the project's probable success, the existence of alternatives "which
are less intrusive on property rights," whether a "disproportionate burden" could
fall on the condemnees, the extent of the private benefits to be conferred, "the
20061
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:547
New London-is clearly a valid goal. However, no matter how valid or
exceptional the end goal appears, the judiciary still has the obligation
to serve as a check on the means being employed to accomplish that
end. 1 13 If this check is removed, there is literally no limit to what will
pass constitutional scrutiny. 114 Thus, in the absence of any meaning-
ful review or limitations hereinafter adopted by the Supreme Court,
other avenues by which to reimpose the necessary restrictions on the
government's ability to exercise the power of eminent domain must be
developed.
C. Planning for the Future: Avoiding the Implications of
Kelo in Nebraska
While the United States Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter
of the United States Constitution, individual state courts are still free
to interpret their state constitutions as affording greater protections
for their citizens. 11 5 As the United States Supreme Court continues to
erode the constitutional boundaries of eminent domain, it is now up to
the individual states to refortify those boundaries. This can conceiva-
bly be accomplished via any of the following courses of action: (1) pro-
viding greater constitutional rights under individual state
constitutions through narrow interpretation of eminent domain pow-
ers; (2) the adoption of constitutional amendments; or (3) modifying
state statutes via legislative action. In order to correctly ascertain the
appropriate course, one must first discern what limitations or express
grants of power a given state's constitution and statutes provide.
extent of the project's development prior to considering the concerns of the con-
demnees," and the opportunity given the condemnees to be heard. Id. An exam-
ple of an appropriate inquiry for the Court to have asked in Kelo would have been
why the private sector was not allowed the opportunity to expand or improve the
area after Pfizer had committed to building its global research and development
plant. Instead of providing the opportunity for private sector development, the
city immediately sought to institute a comprehensive plan to be executed by the
use of eminent domain if necessary.
113. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). In the landmark
case upholding Congress's ability to incorporate a national bank, the Court fa-
mously noted, "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitu-
tion, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitu-
tion, are constitutional." Id.
114. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
115. The United States Constitution serves as a floor on individual rights, below
which a state cannot traverse. See generally Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983) (holding that if a state court bases its interpretation of a provision found in
both the state and federal constitutions upon adequate state grounds the United
States Supreme Court has no right to review the decision).
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1. Avoiding Kelo Through State Constitutional Interpretation
The Nebraska Constitution provides that "[t]he property of no per-
son shall be taken or damaged for public use without just compensa-
tion therefor."116 The similarity of the Nebraska takings clause to
that in the United States Constitution necessarily suggests that if
presented with the issue of deciding the constitutionality of exercising
the power of eminent domain to effectuate an economic development
plan, the Nebraska Supreme Court could rely upon Kelo to approve
such a plan. Indeed, without adjustments to the state constitution or
statutes explicitly precluding the exercise of eminent domain in the
context of economic development, the only thing that would prohibit
the Nebraska Supreme Court would be its own jurisprudence and a
desire to distinguish its interpretation of the Nebraska Constitution
from that of the United States Constitution. 1 17
The Nebraska Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to re-
view the constitutionality of utilizing eminent domain for the purpose
of economic development. However, language found in several of the
court's opinions indicates its willingness to retain the judicial function
of determining what constitutes a public use.1 18 To be sure, oft-cited
language from the court's decision in Burger v. City of Beatrice pro-
vides that "it is essential that a use under the power of eminent do-
main must be a public use, and whether or not the use is public or
private is a judicial question and not a legislative one."1 19 In a recent
decision, the court maintained its position that it will ensure that the
statutory and constitutional requirements for the use of eminent do-
main are met, holding "[tihe power of eminent domain must be exer-
cised 'in strict accordance with its essential elements in order to
protect the constitutional right of the citizen to own and possess prop-
erty against an unlawful perversion of such right."'12o
If an issue factually similar to that presented in Kelo were to come
before the Nebraska Supreme Court it would be a matter of first im-
pression. Therefore, the court is in an advantageous position and has
the ability to learn from the trials and errors of other state supreme
courts already confronted with such issues. Recent case law from the
Michigan Supreme Court provides a good source of guidance for Ne-
braska and other states faced with the decision of how to balance per-
116. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 21. Similarly, the United States Constitution provides that
"private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
117. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
118. See Chimney Rock Irr. Dist. v. Fawcus Springs Irr. Dist., 218 Neb. 777, 779-80,
359 N.W.2d 100, 102 (1984); Burger v. City of Beatrice, 181 Neb. 213, 217, 147
N.W.2d 784, 788 (1967).
119. Burger, 181 Neb. at 217, 147 N.W.2d at 788.
120. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Chaulk, 262 Neb. 235, 245, 631 N.W.2d 131,
140 (2001) (quoting Burger, 181 Neb. at 220, 147 N.W.2d at 784).
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sonal property rights with the sovereign's interest in exercising its
power of eminent domain.
In order to appreciate recent holdings from the Michigan Supreme
Court, it is necessary to review the precedent that was overruled. In
its 1981 landmark decision of Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City
of Detroit, the Michigan Supreme Court deferred to a legislative find-
ing and held that the city's transfer of property to General Motors for
the purpose of economic development satisfied the public-use require-
ment of the state constitution.i2 1 Under the plan, the city projected
that the new plant General Motors planned to build would provide
6,150 jobs and millions of dollars in tax revenue, thus easing the eco-
nomic distress of the local community. 12 2 Despite these grandiose
projections, the development plan grossly failed to live up to expecta-
tions.123 Partly in light of this failure, the Michigan Supreme Court
reviewed the appropriateness of affording such a high level of defer-
ence to a legislative determination twenty-three years later in County
of Wayne v. Hathcock.124
In Hathcock, the issue before the court was whether a proposed
economic development plan designed to supplement the renovation of
the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport was a valid public
use. 12 5 After determining that the proposed plan satisfied the statu-
tory requirements necessary to effectuate the taking, the court then
turned to the constitutional analysis, which ultimately led the court to
overrule its decision in Poletown.12 6 Rather than rejecting the valid-
ity of exercising the power of eminent domain for economic develop-
ment as a fundamental matter, the court provided an analytical
framework under which to review such proposals. The court deline-
ated three criteria which must be met in order for a transfer of con-
demned property to a private entity to be appropriate:
(1) where "public necessity of the extreme sort" requires collective action; (2)
where the property remains subject to public oversight after transfer to a pri-
vate entity; and (3) where the property is selected because of"facts of indepen-
dent public significance," rather than the interests of the private entity to
which the property is eventually transferred.
1 2 7
The court subsequently found that the proposed development plan
did not present an appropriate situation for the exercise of eminent
121. 304 N.W.2d 455, 459-60 (1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d 765 (2004).
122. Id. at 467 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
123. Lewis, supra note 31, at 355-56 (citing Ilya Somin, Poletown Decision Did Not
Cause Desired Benefits, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 8, 2004, at 13A).
124. 684 N.W.2d 765 (2004); Lewis, supra note 31, at 355-56.
125. Hathcock, 685 N.W.2d at 770-72.
126. Id. at 787.
127. Id. at 783. See also Lewis, supra note 31, at 365-70 (providing an analysis of
these three situations).
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domain.128 Additionally, the court noted that the only authority upon
which the county based its argument was that of the majority opinion
in Poletown, and as such, the court overruled its infamous 1981 deci-
sion to the extent that it was inconsistent with Hathcock.129
The decision by the Michigan Supreme Court in Hathcock provides
great guidance for other states faced with determining the constitu-
tionality of takings for economic development. Not only does the test
delineate a plausible way to evaluate the constitutionality of such tak-
ings, it also addresses the difficulties presented by blatantly relying
on legislative determinations that public benefits will be forthcoming
from a government taking.130
Indeed, applying the Hathcock test to the factual context of Kelo
could have very well changed the outcome of the case. First of all, the
existence of a "public necessity of the extreme sort" requiring collec-
tive action is questionable. As previously mentioned, the New London
area was "economically distressed," but whether or not this situation
was so extreme as to require collective action via eminent domain is
debatable.131 Regardless, such a discussion would have been highly
relevant and it undeniably would have provided at least some justifi-
cation for a decision that has become one of the most controversial of
the 2004 Term.132
The second part of the Hathcock test, continued oversight of the
use of the property, potentially could be satisfied in this situation.
The record is replete with references to the ability of the city to recap-
ture the property if not used in accordance and furtherance of the de-
velopment plan.133 Moreover, the Connecticut statutes permitting the
use of eminent domain for economic development stipulate that the
submitted proposal must contain an "administrative plan" and if the
plan is substantially modified, such modification needs to be approved
by the legislature.134
Finally, the third element of the Hathcock test as applied to Kelo
could be equally as controversial as the first. The question of whether
the property was selected to further the interests of private parties
such as Pfizer and Corcoran Jennison or for other facts of public sig-
128. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783-84.
129. Id. at 787.
130. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
131. See Mansnerus, supra note 42.
132. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Ascendant Stevens, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2005, at 52, 52-53
(stating that Kelo was the most controversial decision of the term).
133. See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 543-47 (2004), affd, 125 S. Ct.
2655 (2005).
134. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-189, 8-200 (West 2006).
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nificance is contentious. 13 5 An extensive inquiry into whether private
parties were truly the primary beneficiaries of the takings in the con-
text of the Hathcock test could have served to provide much needed
support for the Court's opinion in Kelo.
Looking retrospectively at its decision in Poletown, the Michigan
Supreme Court concluded that it had chartered the wrong course.
13 6
It had opened the door to the abuse of the limits placed on the exercise
of eminent domain as forewarned by Justice Ryan in his dissent in
Poletown.137 States that have yet to rule on the constitutionality of
governmental takings for the purpose of economic development can
greatly benefit from the Michigan court's realization that such takings
ought to be examined under greater scrutiny. Furthermore, the test
adopted by the Michigan court could prove to be a means by which to
reestablish the rights of individual land owners absent legislative
action.
2. Avoiding Kelo Through Legislative Action
Given the fact that five of the members of the Kelo Court chose to
defer to the local legislature, effectively eroding personal property
rights, some citizens may be uncomfortable with the prospect of leav-
ing their property rights subject to judicial interpretation. Notwith-
standing the Nebraska Supreme Court's past intention to provide
review of a legislative determination of what constitutes a public use
and to ensure that the requirements for the exercise of such power
have been met, the court is not currently precluded from determining
that a proposed economic development plan is a constitutional public
use. 138 Thus, if the citizens of the State of Nebraska are concerned
that a scenario similar to that which played out in New London could
manifest itself in Scottsbluff or Omaha, action can be taken in the
state legislature to either revise the current statutory situation or to
provide the opportunity for citizen approval of a constitutional amend-
135. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 536-42; see also Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002
WL 500238, at *37-39 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002), rev'd in part, 843 A.2d
500 (Conn. 2004), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005); supra note 42.
136. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (2004).
137. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 477-81
(1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting), overruled by Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765.
138. The point is simply that the court's prior decisions have not addressed the issue
of economic development takings, and if faced with one in the future, the court
could well decide that such a taking is for a public use. With its decision in Kelo,
the Court lowered this floor and thus the Nebraska Supreme Court is free to
"sink" that far as well.
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ment.13 9 Indeed, this is the exact remedy suggested by the Court in
Kelo.140
An amendment to the state constitution could theoretically be as
broad or as narrow as the legislature desires so long as it provides
more protection than the Federal Constitution. Quite simply, the
state constitution could be amended by adding language to the takings
clause stipulating that private economic development is not sufficient
to constitute a public use.14 1 In the wake of Kelo, a state senator from
California, Tom McClintock, proposed an amendment to the Califor-
nia Constitution that effectively prohibits the use of eminent domain
for the benefit of private parties under any circumstance. 14 2 In the
preamble to the proposed amendment, Senator McClintock asserts
that although Kelo effectively permits the transfer of private property
to other private entities for profit under the United States Constitu-
tion, Kelo does not require a reciprocal grant of power be permitted by
California's constitution.143 The proposed amendment specifically
provides that property taken for the benefit of private entities is not a
public use and would undeniably provide far greater protection to in-
dividual property rights in the State of California than are afforded
139. Within two months of the Court's decision in Kelo, more than seventy bills had
been introduced by legislators in twenty-eight states. At least five states had
legislators mobilizing support for constitutional amendments, others introduced
bills completely precluding the use of eminent domain for private purposes, and
others, including Connecticut, introduced bills to tighten eminent domain proce-
dures. Tresa Baldas, States Ride Post-'Kelo' Wave of Legislation, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
1, 2005, at 1. In the United States Congress, House Bill 4128 was overwhelm-
ingly passed in the House of Representatives by a vote of 376-38 on November 3,
2005. The bill would prevent the federal government from exercising eminent
domain powers for economic development and would deter states from doing so as
well by cutting off federal economic development funds to a "violating" state for
two fiscal years. Jim Abrams, House Moves to Counter Supreme Court's
'Kelo' Decision, LAW.COM, Nov. 4, 2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=
1131012310814&rss=newswire.
140. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005) ("We emphasize that
nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its
exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many States already impose 'public use'
requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline. Some of these require-
ments have been established as a matter of state constitutional law, while others
are expressed in state eminent domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds
upon which takings may be exercised.").
141. Eight states-Alabama, California, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey,
Ohio, and Texas-have "currently proposed or are drafting [state] constitutional
amendments prohibiting the use of eminent domain for private development."
Baldas, supra note 139.





under the current interpretation of the United States Constitution as
illustrated by Kelo.144
While public support could likely be found for this type of expan-
sive limitation in a conservative state such as Nebraska, there are ad-
vantages and disadvantages of implementing such a broad
prohibition. Notably, this type of amendment may be pushing the de-
bate to the extreme as there could conceivably be some factual context
in which the use of eminent domain may be necessary to effectuate a
development plan that incidentally benefits private parties.14 5 As
previously mentioned, a black-and-white rule either permitting or
prohibiting the use of eminent domain for economic development pur-
poses could be too broad of a stroke. 14 6 Moreover, whether good or
bad, an amendment to the constitution, when weighed against statu-
tory enactments, is the more permanent of the two options. 147 Indeed,
in light of these concerns, statutory modification has proven the more
popular alternative for several states, including Nebraska, in the
wake of Kelo.
Illustratively, just over one month after the Court's decision in
Kelo, a Michigan legislator decided that statutory modification was
appropriate.148 Michigan Representative Aldo Vagnozzi's amendment
to the Michigan eminent domain statutes provides that "[a] taking of
private property... is not considered to be for the use or benefit of the
public if the property is transferred to a private entity for the primary
benefit of the private entity."14 9 This language is not as sweeping as
that proposed by Senator McClintock of California because the lan-
guage only prohibits transfer in the case of the private entity receiving
the primary benefit of the taking. Notably, broad language may not
be needed in Michigan as the state's supreme court has already de-
cided that takings for economic development benefiting private par-
ties necessitate a higher level of review.150 Indeed, the test adopted
by the Michigan Supreme Court in Hathcock provides additional safe-
guards to the bare language of the Michigan Constitution, arguably
obviating the need for a state constitutional amendment. 15 1
144. Id. Contra Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005).
145. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
147. In addition to being more permanent, the constitutional amendment process is
generally more lengthy than statutory enactments. Thus, other potential factors
such as the discouragement of development projects already under way and wan-
ing public support as anger over Kelo subsides will likely be important considera-
tions for legislators as well.




150. See supra subsection IV.C.1.
151. See supra subsection IV.C.1.
[Vol. 85:547
20061 TROUBLE IN FORT TRUMBULL
Similarly, the Nebraska Unicameral has also responded quickly to
Kelo. As early as August 2005, state senators were reportedly "consid-
ering legislative proposals that would tighten the definition of blight,
compensate displaced business owners for lost income, and help move
buildings to another site."15 2 Legislative Bill 924 eventually worked
its way through the Unicameral and was signed by Governor Dave
Heineman on April 13, 2006.153 The amendments to the Nebraska
statutes are clearly aimed at mitigating the effects of Kelo within Ne-
braska, but there could still be some interpretation issues as the law is
applied in the future.
The new law amends the general eminent domain statutes of Ne-
braska, in part by inserting the following language:
Sec. 2. (1) A condemner may not take property through the use of eminent
domain . . . if the taking is primarily for an economic development purpose.
(2) For the purposes of this section, economic development purpose means tak-
ing property for subsequent use by a commercial for-profit enterprise or to
increase tax revenue, tax base, employment, or general economic
conditions. 154
The law goes on to provide seven situations in which this new addition
will not affect the use of eminent domain, such as "[p]ublic projects or
private projects that make all or a major portion of the property avail-
able for use by the general public,"155 projects aimed at eliminating
"an immediate threat to public health and safety,"156 and takings
"based upon a finding of blighted or substandard conditions under the
Community Development Law if the private property is not agricul-
tural land or horticultural land."157
These exceptions to the general proscription of the use of eminent
domain for an "economic development purpose" could shift the argu-
ment to another arena. For instance, one of the exceptions noted
152. Eminent Domain Denied Rehearing, supra note 106, at 4A. See also L.B. 910,
99th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2005), available at http://www.unicam.state.ne.us/pdff
INTROLB91O.pdf (providing for restrictions on the use of eminent domain by
virtue of defining and redefining specific statutory terms); L.B. 924, 99th Leg., 2d
Sess. (Neb. 2005), available at http'J/www.unicam.state.ne.us/pdf/INTROLB924.
pdf (providing for restrictions on the use of eminent domain by changing provi-
sions within the Community Development Law); L.B. 799, 99th Leg., 2d Sess.
(Neb. 2005), available at http://www.unicam.state.ne.us/pdf/INTRO-LB799.pdf
(restricting use of eminent domain and harmonizing statutory language altera-
tions); L.B. 1252, 99th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2005), available at http://www.uni-
cam.state.ne.us/pdf/INTROLB1252.pdf (amending sections 76-701 and 76-
704.01 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes and providing various requirements for
the use of eminent domain).
153. L.B. 924, 99th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2005), available at http://www.unicam.state.
ne.us/legal/SLIPLB924.pdf.
154. Id. § 2.
155. Id. (to be codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-710.04(3)(a)).
156. Id. (to be codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-710.04(3)(b)).
157. Id. (to be codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-710.04(3)(g)).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:547
above turns on "all or a major portion" of the property being available
to the general public. This begs the question of what will constitute a
"major portion." A similar question could present itself regarding the
level of immediateness required for there to be "an immediate threat
to public health and safety." While these matters may seem trivial at
this juncture, industrious municipalities and developers could attempt
to circumvent the intent of the Unicameral's action by careful drafting
and planning of redevelopment projects.
The final potential pressure point to be noted is the exception con-
cerning Nebraska's Community Development Law. Nebraska law has
long included a Community Development Law, which generally pro-
vides for the creation of redevelopment authorities for the purposes of,
among other things, "eliminat[ing], remed[ying], or prevent[ing]"
blighted and substandard areas with a low probability of improve-
ment, and to salvage "substandard and blighted areas [that] can be
conserved and rehabilitated through appropriate public action."158
The ability of an established authority to exercise the power of emi-
nent domain is expressly contingent upon the local municipality first
making the declaration that the area is either "substandard" or
"blighted."159 Thus, a pressure point could exist if local municipalities
attempt to massage the statutory definitions of "substandard" and
158. NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-2102 (Reissue 1997).
159. Id. § 18-2109. The Community Development Law defines "substandard" as:
[A]n area in which there is a predominance of buildings or improvements
... which, by reason of dilapidation, deterioration, age or obsolescence,
inadequate provision for ventilation, light, air, sanitation, or open
spaces, high density of population and overcrowding, or the existence of
conditions which endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or
any combination of such factors, is conducive to ill health, transmission
of disease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency, and crime . . . and is
detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare[.]"
Id. § 18-2103(10). Additionally, "blighted" is defined as:
[A]n area, which (a) by reason of the presence of a substantial number of
deteriorated or deteriorating structures, existence of defective or inade-
quate street layout, faulty lot layout ... insanitary or unsafe conditions,
deterioration of site or other improvements, diversity of ownership, tax
or special assessment delinquency exceeding the fair value of the land,
defective or unusual conditions of title, improper subdivision or obsolete
platting, or the existence of conditions which endanger life or property
by fire and other causes.., substantially impairs... the sound growth
of the community ... or constitutes an economic or social liability and is
detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare in its present
condition and use and (b) in which there is at least one of the following
conditions: (i) Unemployment ... at least one hundred twenty percent of
the state or national average; (ii) the average age of the residential or
commercial units in the area is at least forty years; (iii) more than half of
the plotted and subdivided property in an area is unimproved land that
has been within the city for forty years and has remained unimproved
during that time; (iv) the per capita income of the area is lower than the
average per capita income of the city or village in which the area is des-
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"blighted" so as to bring projects for economic development within
their purview.
As long as the modifications to the general eminent domain stat-
utes provided by Legislative Bill 924 remain in force in Nebraska, the
Nebraska Supreme Court will not be faced with the same issue as that
before the Connecticut Supreme Court-namely, whether or not a tak-
ing for an economic development purpose is permissible. However, an
issue concerning the interpretation of the new Nebraska laws could
very well present itself. It will then once again be in the hands of the
judiciary to determine the limitations of the exercise of eminent do-
main, and ultimately, the rights of individual property owners.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London represents a
further erosion of arguably the quintessential purpose of the Court:
the protection of the individual rights of citizens, specifically the right
to possess and enjoy personal property. While various decisions by
the Court over the course of this century have methodically chipped
away at the limitations imposed by the Takings Clause of the Consti-
tution, the Court's decision in Kelo is an indication that there is no end
in sight.
While the Court should generally afford a level of deference to leg-
islative determinations, this deference should not come at the expense
of sacrificing individual rights. The Court serves as the final check on
the constitutionality of any law enacted by the legislative branches of
government, and if the Court effectively "punts" by refusing to criti-
cally examine the constitutionality of a given law, this important
check is negated. While the Court insists that there are instances in
which a taking would be in violation of the Constitution regardless of
its holding in Kelo, it fails to provide a decipherable test as to when
such a situation would present itself (other than the blatantly obvious
circumstances, in which context a law would likely never be passed).
If the Court had merely applied its prior precedent rather than ex-
tending it, the takings at issue may still have passed constitutional
muster. However, the fact remains that the Court slid further down
the slope of its eminent domain jurisprudence by refusing to apply any
form of heightened review-a review that could have provided some
framework upon which the Court could defend its decision. New
London's desire to revitalize its depressed economy and take advan-
tage of the situation created by the presence of Pfizer is surely a wor-
thy goal to strive toward. However, no matter how valid or desirable
ignated; or (v) the area has had either stable or decreasing population




the end may be, the means by which that end is accomplished are not
automatically legitimate. New London's development plan, no matter
how closely it tracked the requirements provided in Connecticut's emi-
nent domain statutes, should still have been subject to review by the
Court to ensure the constitutional rights of the property owners were
not impaired.
Since the limits upon what constitutes a public use under the Fed-
eral Constitution have been extended to the realm of the public benefit
of increased tax revenue, it is now up to the individual states to reest-
ablish the crucial right to use and enjoy property free from the fear of
unnecessary government interference. Given the fact that the Court
has clearly established that the Federal Constitution provides an ex-
ceptionally low floor for this right under which states can not traverse,
it is now upon the states to provide greater protection. This protection
can be achieved via narrow interpretation of existing state constitu-
tions by adopting a test such as that provided by the Michigan Su-
preme Court in County of Wayne v. Hathcock or fortifying them with
amendments. Should state legislators not find the required support
for all-encompassing constitutional amendments negating the effects
of Kelo, there exists the potentially more viable option of statutory
modification such as that recently signed into law in Nebraska.
Regardless of the action taken by individual states in the wake of
Kelo, the fact remains that something needs to be done in order to
avert the potential ramifications of the United States Supreme Court's
continued slide down a slippery slope of its own devise. The exercise
of the government's power of eminent domain should not be proper
merely because the legislature says it is, but rather if proper, it should
be because such an exercise of power is constitutionally permitted.
Ryan J. Sevcik
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